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DISCRIMINATION LAW-TITLE IX AND SEX DISCRIMINATION 
IN EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT-North Haven Board ofEducation 
v. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
"Today, education is perhaps the most important function of 
state and local government."l This statement, made by the United 
States Supreme Court in 1954, still holds true almost three decades 
later. In school buildings and on college campuses across the nation, 
thousands of people exchange ideas, are instilled with values, and 
prepare for entrance into American society. For the" American edu­
cational system to carry on these functions in a manner that con­
forms to this country's ideals, there must be equal treatment in the 
educational system for every citizen regardless of race, creed, na­
tional origin, or sex. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 
(title IX)2 was enacted to promote equal treatment in education for 
people of both sexes. Title IX sought to reduce, or stop, the expendi­
ture of federal monies to educational programs or activities in which 
sex discrimination occurred: "No person in the United States shall, 
on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...."3 
The Education Amendments of 1972 empower~d the Depart­
ment of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) to promulgate regu­
lations implementing title IX.4 The final regulations were issued in 
1975 and were controversial when released because, among other 
things, they attempted to regulate sex discrimination in educational 
employment.5 This controversy was brought before the United 
I. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
2. 20 U.S.c. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as title IX). 
3. Id. at § 1681(a). 
4. The responsibility for the promulgation of regulations under title IX has been 
transferred from HEW to the newly created Department of Education, 20 U.S.c. § 3401; 
3 C.F.R. Exec. Order No. 12212, (1980). The creation of the Department of Education 
resulted in a change in references to the regulations issued under title IX. The Code of 
Federal Regulations reference to the regulations as issued by HEW was 45 C.F.R. 
§§ 86.51-.61 (1980). The identical regulations have been reissued by the Department of 
Education as 34 C.F.R. §§ 106.51-106.61 (1980). The numbering used in this case note 
will be those of the HEW regulations. 
5. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1980). 
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States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan in Romeo 
Community Schools v. HEW (Romeo £).6 The issue was whether 
HEW had authority under title IX to regulate the employment prac­
tices of educational institutions by withholding federal funds that 
were used by those institutions in a sexually discriminatory manner. 
Within three years of Romeo I, thirteen separate courts confronted 
this issue, and each of the thirteen courts decided that the regulations 
exceeded the authority granted to HEW by title IX.7 On July 24, 
1980, in North Haven Board of Education v. Hufstedler (North Ha­
ven)8 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit be­
came the first court to hold the regulations valid.9 This note will 
explore the rationale for North Haven and will consider the possible 
ramifications of the case. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The North Haven branch of the case arose when Ms. Elaine 
Dove, a former teacher in the North Haven school system, filed a 
complaint with HEW alleging a violation of title IX based on the 
school board's failure to rehire her following a maternity leave. lO 
After an exchange of letters between HEW and the North Haven 
6. 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), ajf'd, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
444 U.S. 972 (1979). 
7. See Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 621 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 16 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 719, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 8241 (W.D. Wash. 1978), cert. granted, 449 U.S. 
1009 (1980); Romeo Community Schools V. HEW, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 438 
F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Junior College Dist. V. 
Califano, 597 F.2d 119 (8th Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 455 F. Supp. 1212 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Isles­
boro School Comm. V. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (1st Cir. 1979), ajf'g, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. 
Me. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Grove City College V. Harris, 500 F. Supp. 
253 (W.D. Pa. 1980); North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
1505,20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,198 (D. Conn. 1979), rev'd sub nom. North Haven Bd. of 
Educ. V. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773, cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. 
Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981); Auburn School Dist. V. HEW, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1504, 
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,146 (D.N.H. 1979); Board of Educ. V. HEW, 19 Fair Empl. 
Prac. Cas. 457, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,085 (N.D. Ohio 1979); University of Toledo V. 
HEW, 464 F. Supp. 693 (N;D. Ohio 1979); Dougherty School Sys. V. Califano, 19 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 688 (M.D. Ga. 1978). 
8. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. 
Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
decided two separate appeals under the designation of North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. 
Hufstedler. The appeals were taken in North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair 
Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505,20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,198 (D. Conn. 1979) and Trumbull Bd. 
of Educ. V. HEW, No. 78-401 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1979) (unreported). The cases involved 
are treated differently on factual points, but both involve the same legal issue. 629 F.2d 
at 774. 
9. 629 F.2d at 786. 
10. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505, 1506 n.l, 
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Board of Education, II the school board filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut 12 assert­
ing that the regulation 13 promulgated by HEW requiring that preg­
nancy be treated as a temporary disability was beyond the authority 
granted to the agency under title IX.14 Judge Ellen Bree Bums 
granted summary judgment for the North Haven board based on 
Romeo I, which held that the regulations l5 exceeded the intention of 
Congress, were beyond the meaning of the statutory language, and 
called for remedies that were too drastic and far-reaching. 16 
The Trumbull branch of the case began when Ms. Linda Potz, a 
former guidance counselor at a junior high school in Trumbull, Con­
necticut, filed a complaint with HEWP An investigation conducted 
by HEW concluded that: Ms. Potz was the only female guidance 
counselor at the junior high school level in the Trumbull system; she 
had been asked to falsify a title IX self-evaluation report; she had 
been replaced by a male; and that she had been required to type 
notices and run errands for the male principal. I8 HEW concluded 
that the school board was motivated by Ms. Potz' gender when the 
board made its decision not to renew her contract. 19 
After its investigation, HEW ordered the Trumbull board to 
take corrective action.20 The school board instead brought suit in 
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut21 
contending that HEW lacked authority under title IX to promulgate 
regulations concerning sex discrimination in educational employ­
20 Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 30,198, at 12061 n.1 (D. Conn. 1979) (Secretary Hufstedler was 
substituted for former Secretary Califano). 
II. Id. at 1506, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 12,062. 
12. Id. at 1505, 20 Empl. Prac. Dec. at 12,061. 
13. 45 C.F.R. § 86.57(c) (1980). 
14. Joint Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at I, North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Huf­
stedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cerl. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. 
Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees). 
15. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1980). 
16. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Califano, 19 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1505, 1507-09, 
20 Empl. Prac. Dec., ~ 30,198, at 12,062-64. 
17. Brieffor Appellant Linda Potz at 4-7, North Haven V. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 
(2d Cir. 1980), cerl. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant Linda Potz). 
18. Id. at 6-7. None of these activities were required of her male colleagues. Id. 
19. Id. at 7. 
20. Id. at 5. 
21. Trumbull Bd. of Educ. V. HEW, No. 78-401 (D. Conn. Sept. 13, 1979) 
(unreported). 
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ment.22 Judge Bums granted a motion for summary judgment refer­
ring to her previous decision in the North Haven branch of the case 
in which she held that the regulations exceeded HEW's authority 
under title IX.23 HEW and Ms. Potz appealed to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 24 
III. ANALYSIS BY THE COURTS 
The issue before the Second Circuit in North Haven was 
whether HEW had authority under title IX to regulate the employ­
ment practices of the North Haven and Trumbull boards of educa­
tion. The inquiry commenced with an examination of the language 
of the statute.25 
HEW argued that the term "no person" indicated a broad cate­
gory of potential beneficiaries limited only by the language of the 
statute.26 The qualifications for a potential beneficiary are that the 
person must "be excluded from participation in, be denied the bene­
fits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational pro­
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance ...."27 In 
Romeo I, Judge John Feikens concluded that it was difficult to fit 
teachers within these boundaries because teachers: Participate only 
to the extent of teaching; benefit only to the extent of salaries; and 
are subject to discrimination only to the extent that the programs 
themselves may be established or operated in a discriminatory man­
ner.28 In North Haven, the Second Circuit found that the language 
of the statute was ambiguous as to whether teachers were included.29 
In support of its position, the Second Circuit pointed to similar con­
fusion in Congress over a parallel section of Title VI of the Civil 
22. Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 5, supra note 17; Brief for PlaintiffS-Appellees 
at 3, supra note 14. 
23. 629 F.2d at 775; Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 3-4, supra note 14. 
24. 629 F.2d at 773. 
25. Id. at 777. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 756 
(1975) . ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is the lan­
guage itself.") 
26. Brief for Federal Appellants at 13-14, North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Hufstedler, 
629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. grantedsub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 450 
U.S. 909 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Fed. Appellants). 
27. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976). There is potential confusion about the numbering 
of the section of title IX at its various stages of development. During the congressional 
debate, the proposal was designated title X and numbered accordingly. Finally, title IX 
was codified at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) and a third set of numbers was created. 
28. 438 F. Supp. at 1031-32. See also Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 
F.2d 424, 426 (1st Cir. 1979). 
29. 629 F.2d at 777-78. 
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Rights Act of 1964 (title VI).30 Congress clarified title VI by amend­
ing it to explicitly exclude employment from coverage.31 Title IX 
was not clarified in any corresponding manner. 32 
Title IX also contained a series of exceptions or delays in imple­
mentation for special institutions, organizations, or activities.33 
None of these exceptions precisely dealt with any aspect of employ­
ment. The exceptions excluded whole classes of educational institu­
tions,34 certain types of activities that might be undertaken at an 
institution otherwise covered,35 and scholarships received as prizes in 
beauty contests.36 When Romeo Community Schools v. HEW (Ro­
meo 1I)37 reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit, the court decided that all the exceptions related exclusively 
to students, student bodies, or participants in educational pro­
38grams. It therefore "may be fairly assumed" that professional edu­
cation employees were not covered by title IX. 39 The Second Circuit 
disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and noted that the exceptions for 
religious and military schools did not mention students at all, but 
excluded entire institutions from coverage.40 It concluded that the 
exceptions were ambiguous.41 Whether professional employees, in 
addition to students, were to be protected against sex discrimination 
under title IX was tmclear from the statutory language.42 
30. Id. at 77S; see notes 95-9S infra and accompanying text. 
31. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-3 (1976); 110 CONGo REC. 11930 (1964); see Kuhn, Title LY: 
Employment andAthletics Are Outside HEW's Jurisdiction, 65 GEO. L.l. 49, 53-54 (1976). 
32. CONF. REP. No. 79S, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221, reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 260S, 2671-72. 
33. Exceptions to 20 U.S.c. § 16SI(a) (1976) are: (I) Classes of educational insti­
tutions subject to prohibition; (2) educational institutions commencing planned change 
in admissions; (3) educational institutions of religious organizations with contrary reli­
gious tenets; (4) educational institutions training individuals for military services or 
merchant marine; (5) public educational institutions with traditional and continuing ad­
missions policies admitting only one sex; (6) social fraternities or sororities, voluntary 
youth service organizations; (7) boy or girl conferences; (S) father-son or mother-daugh­
ter activities at educational institutions; and (9) scholarship awards from "beauty" pag­
eants that facilitate attendance at institutions of higher education. Id. § 16SI(a)(1)-(9). 
34. Id. § 16SI(a)(2)-(5). 
35. Id. § 16SI(a)(6)-(S). 
36. Id. § 16SI(a)(9). 
37. 600 F.2d 5S1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). 

3S. Id. at 584. 

39. Id. See also liS CONGo REC. 5S12 (1972) (comment of Senator Bayh, "In the 
area of employment, we permit no exceptions."). 
40. 629 F.2d at 77S. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLE IX 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit con­
cluded that the language of title IX was unclear regarding Congress' 
intention to cover professional education employees. The court then 
considered the legislative history in its attempt to decipher the legis­
lative purpose of title IX.43 The legislative history can be divided 
into four parts. This note first considers proposals similar to title IX 
that were offered in Congress prior to title IX, but either were with­
drawn or were not approved. Second, the debate of title IX itself is 
considered. Third, the reports of the House, Senate, and Conference 
Committees are examined. Finally, the amendments and the pro­
posed amendments to title IX that were offered after the law was 
passed will be reviewed. 
A. Proposals Offered Prior To Tille IX 
Prior to the consideration of the bill that later became title IX, 
Senator Birch Bayh offered a bill in 197144 that clearly was described 
as covering employment.45 Senator George McGovern indicated 
that rather than introduce a bill of his own dealing with sex discrimi­
nation, he would support Senator Bayh's bill.46 When announcing 
the retraction of his proposal, Senator McGovern adverted to statis­
tics indicating the low national percentage of female college profes­
sors in order to demonstrate a problem he hoped Senator Bayh's bill 
would rectify.47 In the House of Representatives, Representative 
Edith Green submitted an amendment to insert the word "sex" after 
"race, religion, and national origin" in title VI.48 None of these bills 
were enacted,49 but they indicate congressional awareness of the 
need to deal with the problem of sex discrimination in education. In 
43. Id. at 778-83; see 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
184-90 (4th ed. 1973); Buek & Orleans, Sex Discrimination - A Bar to A Democratic Edu­
calion: Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of1972, 6 CONN. L. REV. 1 
(1973). 
44. 117 CONGo REC. 30155-56 (1971). 
45. Id. 
46. Id. at 30411. 
47. 1d. 
48. Id. at 9822. The process of amending title VI by the introduction of "sex" 
where appropriate was dropped because under Senate rules the whole of title VI might
have been opened for amendment.. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, § 135(a), 60 
Stat. 812, 832 (1946) (current version codified at 2 U.S.c. § 190c (1976». 
49. Senator Bayh's bill was dropped as nongermane. 117 CONGo REC. 30412-15 
(1971). Senator McGovern supported Senator Bayh's bill rather than introduce a propo­
sal of his own. 1d. at 30411. Congresswoman Green's bill was withdrawn. H.R. REP. 
No. 16098, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). 
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addition, at least two sponsors characterized sex discrimination in 
educational employment as a portion of the larger problem of sex 
discrimination in all professions. 50 
In 1972, Senator Bayh introduced an amendment5) that was to 
become title IX.52 Senator Bayh said that his amendment was 
"broad" and would close loopholes in previous legislation relating to 
educational programs and employment.53 He pointed to "admis­
sions procedures, scholarships, and faculty employment" as being 
covered by the amendment. 54 
In Romeo I, Judge Feikens referred to only this passage from 
the d~bate on title IX in his analysis of the legislative history. 55 He 
concluded that, since the comments applied to all of Senator Bayh's 
amendment, including the amendments to Title VII of the Equal 
Rights Act of 1964 (title VII)56 and the Equal Pay for Professional 
Women Act (Equal Pay Act),57 the employment references were to 
those amendments and not to title IX. 58 
B. 	 Senate Debate On Title IX 
The quantity of congressional debate considered relevant by the 
judiciary increased in later cases. Where Judge Feikens had consid­
ered only one passage of the Bayh debate in Romeo I, three passages 
from the same debate were examined by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit when the court delivered its decision in 
Islesboro School Committee v. Califano .59 The passages are: First, a 
dialogue between Senators Bayh and Claiborne Pell; second, a state­
50. 	 117 CONGo REC. 13546-62, 30411 (1971). 
51. 	 118 CONGo REC. 5802-03 (1972). 
52. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1976); 42 U.S.c. § 2000e (1976). See also Brief for 
Fed. Appellants at 24, supra note 26. 
53. 	 118 CONGo REC. 5803 (1972). Senator Bayh said, 
Amendment No. 874 is broad, but basically it closes loopholes in existing 
legislation relating to general education programs and employment resulting 
from those programs. . . . [T)he heart of this amendment is a provision ban­
ning sex discrimination in educational programs receiving Federal funds. The 
amendment would cover such crucial aspects as admissions procedures, schol­
arships, and/aculty employment, with limited exceptions .... 
Id. (emphasis added). 
54. 	 Id. 
55. 	 438 F. Supp. at 1030. 
56. 	 42 U.S.c. § 2000e 
57. 	 § 2000e-16 (1976). 
58. 	 438 F. Supp. at 1030. 
59. 593 F.2d 424, 426-28 (1st Cir. 1979), affg, 449 F. Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979) (The First Circuit invalidated HEW's regulation under title 
IX of the school board's maternity leave policy.) 
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ment by Senator Bayh correlating the employment sections of his 
bill with the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act; and 
third, a summary of the bill that Senator Bayh read into the record.60 
The dialogue between Senators Pell and Bayh was quoted by 
the First Circuit as follows: 
Mr. Pell: ... Sections 1011 [sic] (a) and (b) [these sections, in 
large measure, became 20 U.S.C. § l68l(a) and (c)] include all ed­
ucational institutions which receive Federal Assistance. This in­
cludes elementary and secondary schools as well. With regard to 
private undergraduate colleges, the Senator has excluded from 
coverage their admissions practices. Does this same exclusion ap­
ply to nonpublic institutions at the elementary and secondary 
level? 
Mr. Bayh: At the elementary and secondary levels, admis­
sions policies are not covered. As the Senator knows, we are deal­
ing with three basically different types of discrimination here. We 
are dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, dis­
crimination of available services or studies within an institution 
once students are admitted, and discrimination in employment 
within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever. 
In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions. In the 
area of services, once a student is accepted within an institution, 
we permit no exceptions. The Senator from Rhode Island asked 
about admissions policies of private secondary and primary 
schools. They would be excepted.61 
The court concluded that a reading of the passage in context 
would not support HEW's conclusion that the dialogue showed con­
gressional intention that title IX cover employment.62 The court 
noted: "While Senator Bayh's response was more extended than it 
needed to be for a direct answer to Senator Pell's question, we think 
HEW's reading is strained."63 
The Islesboro court next considered a part of Senator Bayh's 
comments in which he said that the second major portion of his 
amendment would expand the coverage of title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act to those "who 'perform work connected with the educa­
60. Id. at 427-28. The passage upon which Judge Feikens relied was not men­
tioned in Islesboro. The court noted occasional lapses in the debate where some senators 
appeared to suggest that title IX covered employment. Id. at 428. 
61. Id. at 427 (quoting 118 CONGo REc. 5812 (1972) (dialogue of Senator 8ayh & 
Senator Pell». 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
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tional activities' of the institution."64 The court believed this passage 
reinforced the idea that Senator Bayh linked employment with his 
amendments to title VII and to the Equal Pay Act, while he linked 
title IX to students.6s 
The third portion of the debate considered by the court was a 
summary of Senator Bayh's amendment as put in the record.66 This 
summary, the First Circuit contended, included, inter alia, four parts: 
First, Basic Prohibition; second, Enforcement and Related Provi­
sions; third, Employment; and finally, Equal Pay for Professional 
Women.67 The employment section referred to the amendments to 
title VII68 and the Equal Pay Act.69 The court concluded that this 
division demonstrated that title IX was concerned with admissions 
and services, while the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act dealt with employment.7o 
Two of the three passages noted by the First Circuit in Islesboro 
reappeared in the briefs7l submitted to the Second Circuit.72 The 
North Haven and Trumbull school boards used Senator Bayh's sum­
mary in a broader fashion than did the court in Islesboro. The 
school boards looked not only at the concise, section-by-section sum­
mary, but also at the summary given in Senator Bayh's own words.73 
They argued that Part A, "Prohibition of Sex Discrimination in Fed­
erally Funded Education Programs,"74 dealt with discrimination 
against "beneficiaries" under title IX.7S Plaintiffs believed that Part 
B, "Prohibition of Education-Related Employment Discrimina­
tion,"76 referred to the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay 
64. Id. at 428. 
65. /d. 
66. 118 CONGo REc. 5806-08 (1972). 
67. 593 F.2d at 428. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. See also Romeo Community Schools V. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 585 (6th Cir.), 
cerr. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). 
70. 593 F.2d at 428. 
71. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 18-20, supra note 14; Reply Brief for Federal 
Appellants at 2; North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Hufstedler, 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), 
cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. V. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981) [hereinafter 
cited as Brief for Fed. Appellants). 
72. The passage purporting to show Senator Bayh's linking of employment with 
title VII and the Equal Pay Act does not reappear. See notes 62-63 supra and accompa­
nying text. 
73. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 19, supra note 14; see 118 CONGo REC. 5807-08 
(1972). 
74. Brief for PlaintiffS-Appellees at 19, supra note 14. 
75. Id. at 18. 
76. Id. at 19. 
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Act.77 In its reply brief, HEW noted that a passage appeared in Part 
A (which the school board contended applied to title IX) that explic­
itly· referred to "employment practices for faculty and administra­
tors."78 In North Haven, the Second Circuit remarked on the 
significance of this passage in its analysis of the case.79 
The dialogue between Senators Pell and Bayh80 was utilized by 
HEW in its brief submitted to the Second Circuit.8l The Second Cir­
cuit critically reviewed the debate, considered both the initial ex­
change and the questions following, and concluded that the dialogue 
indicated a link between title IX and employment.82 
The dialogue specifically focused on the part of Senator Bayh's 
amendment that became title IX.83 Employment was mentioned ex­
plicitly as an area to be covered by the amendment.84 The discus­
sion did not stop there. Senator Pell followed up with a series of 
questions that directly related to specific exceptions to title IX. 85 The 
Second Circuit considered the followup questions asked by Senator 
Pell and Senator Bayh's responses to them in its analysis. The court 
concluded that the entire dialogue was so closely related to the ex­
77. Id. at 18. 
78. Reply Brief for Fed. Appellants at 2, supra note 71. The portion of Senator 
Bayh's summary omitted by plaintiffs-appellees reads as follows: 
This portion of the amendment covers discrimination in all areas where abuse 
has been mentioned---employment practices forfaculty and administrators, schol­
arship aid, admissions, access to programs within the institution such as voca­
tional education classes, and so forth. The provisions have been tested under 
Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the last 8 years so that we have evi­
dence of their effectiveness and flexibility. 
118 CONGo REC. 5807 (1972) (emphasis added). 
79. 629 F.2d at 780-81. See Dougherty School Sys. v. Harris, 622 F.2d 735 (5th 
Cir. 1980), cert . ./iled, 50 U.S.L.W. 3079 (U.S. Dec. 22, 1980) (No. 80-1023). 
80. 118 CONGo REC. 5812-13 (1972); see notes 84-85 infra and accompanying text. 
81. Brief for Fed. Appellants at 27-28, supra note 26. 
82. 629 F.2d at 782. 
83. 118 CONGo REC. 5812-13 (1972). 
84. Id. 
85. Mr. PELL: Thank you. Sections lOOI(a) and (b) include all educa­
tional institutions which receive Federal assistance. This includes elementary 
and secondary schools as well. With regard to private undergraduate colleges, 
the Senator has excluded from covera~e their admissions practices. Does the 
same exclusion apply to non public institutions at the elementary and secondary 
level? 
Mr. BA YH: At the elementary and secondary levels, admissions policies 
are not covered. As the Senator knows, we are dealing with three basically 
different types of discrimination here. We are dealing with discrimination in 
admission to an institution, discrimination of available services or studies 
within an institution once students are admitted, and discrimination in employ­
ment within an institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever. 
In the area of employment, we permit no exceptions. In the area of serv­
ices, once a student is accepted within an institution, we permit no exceptions. 
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ceptions to title IX as to make no sense if title IX did not cover 
employment.86 
In its brief, HEW also asked the court to consider the explana­
tion that Senator Bayh offered concerning the scope of his amend­
ment.87 After quoting Senator Bayh's introductory passage, which 
said that his amendment would close loopholes in previous legisla­
tion related to education and employment, HEW quoted Senator 
Bayh further: "Other important provisions in the amendment would 
extend the equal employment opportunities provisions of Title VII 
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act to educational institutions, and extend 
the Equal Pay for Equal Work Act to include executive, administra­
tive and professional women."88 The structure of the passage thus 
takes on a two-part organization. The first part, which Judge 
Feikens discussed, refers to title IX; while the second portion, quoted 
by HEW, refers to the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay 
Act.89 
The Senator from Rhode Island asked about admissions policies of private sec­
ondary and primary schools. They would be excepted. 
Mr. PELL: That is in the area of non public elementary and secondary 
schools. 
Mr. BAYH: The Senator is correct. This is one of the exceptions. 
Mr. PELL: Mr. President, do I understand the Senator to say that the 
faculty of private schools would have to reflect a sexual balance? 
Mr. BAYH: This amendment sets no quotas. It only guarantees equality 
of opportunity. The Senator from Indiana cannot be sure about the sexual bal­
ance many facultx, but as far as employment opportunities are concerned, the 
answer would be ·Yes." 
Mr. PELL: The Senator means that a private school for girls, for the sake 
of argument, would have to accept men teachers, or vice versa? 
Mr. BAYH: Someone would have to prove that they did discriminate 
against teachers first. The Senator is correct insofar as he is saying that discrim­
ination on the basis of sex would be forbidden. 
Mr. PELL: Would this apply to a parochial school where they have nuns 
as teachers? 
Mr. BAYH: No. There is an explicit exception for educational institutions 
controlled by a religious organization. 
Mr. PELL: Wliat about a boys' prep school? Would there have to be wo­
men on the faculty there? 
Mr. BAYH: The answer is "Yes." That does not guarantee a balance, as 
the Senator knows. However, if discrimination can be proven, the answer is 
"Yes." 
Mr. PELL: Mr. President, I refer to a preparatory school such as Peekskill 
Military Institute which is at the high school level. Would that school be ex­
pected to have women teachers? 
Mr. BAYH: I am not sure. Is this a military school? 
Mr. PELL: It is a military school. However, it is at the high school level. 
Mr. BAYH: All military schools are excluded. 
Id. 
86. 629 F.2d at 782. 
87. Brief for Fed. Appellants at 24-25, supra note 26. 
88. Id. at 24 (emphasis omitted). 
89. The debate conducted in the House of Representatives is not really at issue. 
HEW has conceded that the House bill was not intended to cover employment. Reply 
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C. Congressional Committee Reports On Title IX 
Both the Senate and the House of Representatives passed edu­
cation amendments in 1972.90 The amendments were different and a 
Conference Committee was convened to reconcile the bills.91 "Title 
IX was patterned after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."92 
The wording of the basic provision of title VI is virtually the same as 
that of title IX.93 Such an obvious parallel seems to indicate that 
Congress intended the two bills to be interpreted similarly.94 During 
the congressional debate on title VI, confusion arose as to whether 
title VI covered discrimination in employment.95 To clarify the 
scope of title VI, section 604 was added.96 Section 604 explicitly re­
moved employment from the bill's coverage.97 The House version of 
title IX incorporated a section 1004,98 a duplicate of section 604 that 
later was deleted by the Conference Committee from the final 
version.99 
In Romeo I, Judge Feikens observed the absence of a section in 
title IX that paralleled section 604 of title VI. 100 This, he concluded, 
was not an indication of an intent to cover employment, but was an 
effort to be consistent with the amendments to title VII and the 
Brief for Fed. Appellants at 2-4, supra note 70. The House clearly intended to reach 
employment through the amendments to title VII or the Equal Pay Act. H.R. REP. No. 
554, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1971), reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 
2462, 2566, (The section in the House bill excluding employment from coverage was 
section 1004 of title X.) 
90. Senate bill S. 659 passed on March I, 1972. 118 CONGo REC. 6277 (1972). 
House bill 7248 passed on June 8, 1972. Id. at 20340. 
91. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. I (1972), reprinted in (1972) U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2608, 2608. 
92. Cannon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694-96 (1979). 
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976). "No person in the United States shall, on the ground 
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits 
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance." Id. Compare itl. with 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a) (1976). 
94. Caimon V. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696 (1979); see Kokoska V. 
Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974). 
95. 110 CONGo REC. 2484 (1964); id. at 12707; Kuhn, supra note 31, at 53. 
96. 110 CONGo REC. 11930 (1964). 
97. 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-3 (1976). "Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be 
construed to authorize action under this subchapter by any department or agency with 
respect to any employment practice of any employer, employment agency, or labor 
oganization except where a primary objective of the Federal financial assistance is to 
provide employment." Id. 
98. 118 CONGo REc. 20340 (1972). 
99. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1972), reprinted in (1972) U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2608, 2671-72. 
100. 438 F. Supp. at 1030. 
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Equal Pay Act that were parts of the Education Amendments of 
1972.101 Support for Judge Feikens' conclusion came from Repre­
sentative James O'Hara, who indicated at hearings that section 1004 
of the House bill never should have been included, but was carried 
over erroneously from a mockup of title VI that had been used in the 
drafting process. 102 The Conference Committee, according to Repre­
sentative O'Hara, simply corrected the error. 103 
In North Haven, the Second Circuit disagreed with this analy­
SiS. I04 The court found no language in the Conference Committee 
report, or elsewhere in the legislative history, that indicated the dele­
tion was necessary to maintain consistency with title VII and the 
Equal Pay Act portions of the amendments. !Os A limited exception, 
similar to section 1004, easily could have been drafted to avoid any 
inconsistency; 106 thus, the deletion of section 1004 by the Conference 
Committee may have indicated disagreement with the section. 
D. Post-Enactment Events Impact On Interpretation Of Title IX 
Since the enactment of title IX, Congress has been vocal regard­
ing its proper interpretation. Post-enactment events first were dis­
cussed in Islesboro by the United States District Court· for the 
District of Maine. 107 Islesboro held invalid the regulation, under ti­
tle IX, of the school board's maternity leave policy. lOS Judge Ed­
ward Thaxter Gignoux gave momentary consideration to comments 
supporting title IX's coverage of employment that were made during 
the hearings of the regulations promulgated by HEW under title 
IX.I09 The judge instead focused on congressional failure to disap­
prove the regulations. 110 Judge Gignoux interpreted the failure to 
101. Id. See also Romeo Community Schools v. HEW, 600 F.2d 581, 584 (6th 
Cir.), cerl. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 
424,428-29 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979); Kuhn, supra note 31, at 60-61. 
102. Sex IJiscrimination Regulations: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Postsecon­
dary Educ. ofthe Comm. on Edue. and Labor-Review ofRegulations to Implement Title 
IX, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 408-09 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Postsecondary Hearings]. 
103. Id. 
104. 629 F.2d at 782-83. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 783. Judge Oakes, writing for the Second Circuit, suggested the follow­
ing example: "'Nothing in § 901 shall apply to any employees of any educational insti­
tution subject to this title except where a primary objective of the Federal assistance is to 
provide employment:" Id. See notes 127-28 infra and accompanying text. 
107. 449 F. Supp. at 872-73. 
108. Id. at 872. 
109. Id.; see Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 164, 173,201. 
110. 449 F. Supp. at 873. 
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disapprove in light of Title 20 of the United States Code, section 
1232(d)(I),111 which said that failure to disapprove regulations was 
not to be deemed approval or a "finding of consistency with the Act 
from which it derives its authority ...."112 The court concluded 
that section 1232(d)(l) vitiates the HEW interpretation of Congress' 
action. I \3 . 
When the issue came before the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit in North Haven, the post-enactment events 
received further analysis. The Second Circuit initially looked at a 
summary of title IX prepared by Dr. Bernice Sandler of the Associa­
tion of American Colleges. 114 The summary had been introduced 
into the Congressional Record by Senator Bayh. 115 The court 
pointed to a footnote in Dr. Sandler's summaryl16 which said, in 
part: "Title VI ... specifically excludes employment from coverage 
(except where the primary objective of the federal aid is to provide 
employment). There is no similar exemption for employment in the 
sex discrimination provisions relating to federally assisted education 
programs."117 Senator Bayh, only two months after title IX became 
law, apparently felt this was a fair statement of congressional pur­
pose, because he introduced the summary into the Congressional 
Record. I IS 
The Second Circuit also considered Senator Bayh's testimony at 
the hearings before the Subcommittee on Postsecondary Education 
of the Committee of Education and Labor. 119 After three years, Sen­
ator Bayh still insisted that congressional intent in passing title IX 
was to cover employment. 120 The Senator testified that title IX man­
dated equality in "admissions, financial aid, course offerings, career 
counseling, and in the case of teachers and other educational person­
nel, employment, pay and promotions."121 
HEW was required to submit to Congress the regulations it 
Ill. Id.; see 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d)(1) (1976). 
112. 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d)(I) (1976). Bul see 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 25 (1980) (Attorney 
General Civiletti suggested that 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d) is unconstitutional as a violation of 
the separation of powers.). 
113. 449 F. Supp. at 873. 
114. 629 F.2d at 782. 
115. 118 CONGo REC. 24684 (1972). 
116. 629 F.2d at 782. 
117. 118 CONGo REC. 24684 n.1 (1972) (emphasis in original). 
118. 629 F.2d at 782. Bul see Kuhn, supra note 31, at 56-57. 
119. Poslsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 173. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
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promulgated under title IX. Congress had a forty-five day period 
during which it could disapprove any of the regulations by concur­
rent resolution. 122 Two resolutions were submitted. The first, by 
Senator Jesse Helms, resolved to disapprove all title IX regula­
tions.123 The second resolution was submitted by Representatives 
Albert Quie and John Erlenboml24 and recommended Congress dis­
approve only subpart E of the regulations. 125 Congress did not ac­
cept either of the proposed resolutions. 126 
Two amendments to eliminate employment from the scope of 
title IX have been introduced in Congress since the hearings on the 
regulations. Senator Jesse Helms attempted to limit coverage by an 
amendment which said in part: "Nothing in [section 901 of title IX] 
shall apply to any employees of any educational institution subject 
to this title." 127 This amendment was not adopted. 128 Senator James 
McClure tried to limit coverage of title IX to the "curriculum or 
graduation requirements of the institutions" receiving federal assist­
ance. 129 This proposed amendment also was defeated. l3O 
v. ApPLICABILITY OF REMEDIES IN TITLE IX EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION 
Following a review of both the language of title IX and its legis­
lative history, the courts considered the difficulties and ramifications 
of the application of title IX to the problem of sex discrimination in 
educational employment. The primary remedy provided by title IX 
was the termination of federal assistance to any institution adminis­
tratively adjudged to be in violation of the statute and the accompa­
nying regulations. 131 Judge Feikens, in Romeo I, considered the 
termination of federal funding a drastic remedy132 and believed it 
would be arbitrary to terminate funding that was provided for stu­
122. 20 U.S.c. § 1232(d)(I) (1976). 
123. 121 CONGo REC. 17301 (1975). 
124. Hearings on H. Con. Res. 330 Before the Subcomm. on ofthe Comm. on Educ. 
and Labor, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (A copy is on file with the Committee). 
125. Id. The disputed regulations, 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61, are the same as Subpart 
E. 
126. See 629 F.2d at 784. 
127. 121 CONGo REC. 23845-47 (1975). 
128. See 629 F.2d at 784. 
129. 122 CONGo REC. 28147 (1976). 
130. Id. 
131. 20 U.s.c. § 1682(1) (1976). 
132. 438 F. Supp. at 1032-33. Judge Feikens offered no suggestions as to what less 
drastic remedies there might be. 
302 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:287 
dents because of discrimination against employees. 133 
The Second Circuit dismissed Judge Feikens' argument even 
though it "purports to speak both to the heart and to 'common sense' 
...."134 Arbitrary action would not be confined to termination of 
federal funds because of discrimination against employees, but also 
would occur in some cases involving students. If one student was 
discriminated against, HEW could terminate funds to the entire 
school district. As a result, those students not discriminated against 
would be deprived of the benefits of the federal assistance. 135 
The remedy provision of title IX also contained a stipulation 
that any fund termination "be limited to the particular political en­
tity, or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has 
been made, and shall be limited in its effect to the particular pro­
gram, or part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so 
found...."136 Judge Feikens said, "[R]egulation of employment 
practices, however, is inherently non-'program specific.' An educa­
tional institution's employment policies are general in nature, cover­
ing, by and large, all faculty employees involved in all of an 
institution's education programs, whether federally funded or 
not."137 Application of the fund termination remedy to discrimina­
tion in employment would then be impossible because the statute 
requires "program specific" application. Judge Feikens concluded 
that Congress could not have intended title IX to cover sex discrimi­
nation in employment because employment cannot be regulated in a 
"program specific" manner.138 
The Second Circuit disagreed with Judge Feikens' determina­
tion that employment is inherently nonprogram specific within the 
meaning of the remedy provision of title IX.139 The court pointed to 
the example of admissions and said, "[D]iscrimination in admissions 
. . . is clearly prohibited by Title IX regardless of whether the dis­
crimination occurs solely in one . . . program or all . . . pro­
grams."I40 The objection by Judge Feikens could be applied to 
133. Id. at 1032. 
134. 629 F.2d at 785. 
135. Id. 
136. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). 
137. 438 F. Supp. at 1033. See Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 1212, 
1215 (E.D. Mo. 1978); Seattle Univ. v. HEW, 16 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 719, 721-22, 16 
Empl. Prac. Dec. ~ 8241 at 5245 (W.D. Wash. 1978), affd, 621 F.2d 992 (6th Cir. 1979), 
cert. granted, 449 U.S. 1009 (l980). 
138. 438 F. Supp. at 1033. 
139. 629 F.2d at 785. 
140. Id. See also Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 414. 
1981) SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 303 
admissions programs that Congress clearly intended to be covered. 
The objection that employment is nonprogram specific sweeps too 
broadly and leads to more inconsistencies than it prevents. Al­
though the fund termination remedy presents some problems in its 
application, the Second Circuit felt that none of the difficulties were 
sufficient to prevent coverage of employment under title IX.141 
VI. SECOND CIRCUIT CONCLUSIONS 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reached three conclusions about title IX and employment. First, the 
language of title IX is ambiguous as to whether employment is cov­
ered. 142 Second, the legislative history "lends some additional weight 
to the view that [section 1681] was expressly intended to relate to 
employment practices."143 Finally, no practical or theoretical objec­
tions to coverage of employment were sufficient to disrupt the other 
two conclusions. l44 Since the question whether title IX covered em­
ployment was resolved in the affirmative, a new issue arose. Did 
Congress intend title IX to cover all aspects of employment? The 
Second Circuit concluded that the regulations issued by HEW under 
title IX were valid. 145 This conclusion apparently endorsed all the 
regulations on sex discrimination in educational employment 
promulgated under title IX by HEW.I46 
VII. ANALYSIS OF TITLE IX AND EDUCATIONAL EMPLOYMENT 
The analysis and the resolution of whether Congress intended to 
reach sex discrimination in educational employment through title IX 
cannot be separated from the social and cultural setting of the early 
1970's. In 1970 and 1971, the United States population became in­
creasingly aware of the inequalities facing women in American soci­
ety. For three days in May 1970, the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Amendments conducted hearings on the Equal 
Rights Amendment. 147 During that year and the following year, 
141. 629 F.2d at 785. 
142. Id. at 777-78. 
143. Id. at 784. 
144. Id. at 784-85. Neither the possible overlapping of jurisdiction between title 
VII and the Equal Pay Act with title IX, nor the possible penalties which might accrue to 
students, nor the program specific limitation are sufficient to overcome the evidence of 
congressional intent to cover employment under title IX. Id. 
145. Id. at 786. 
146. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979). 
147. See also Hearings on S. Joint Res. 61 BefOre the Subcomm. on Constitutional 
Amendments oflhe Senate Comm. on Ihe Judiciary, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess., (1970); Hearings 
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three bills that attempted to deal with sex discrimination in educa­
tion were introduced in the Congress. 148 Congressional awareness of 
the issue was raised, and the milieu for legislative action existed. 
Educational systems in American have been a major force in 
shaping the consciousness of the population; thus, education was 
considered a priority for "equalization."149 Congress learned from 
the desegregation efforts of the 1960's that the nation's educational 
systems were places of potential conflict in any effort to provide 
equal treatment for citizens. The lesson resulted in the use of title 
VI,ISO the legal keystone of the desegregation struggle, as a model for 
title IX.IS I 
The United States Supreme Court defined the congressional 
purpose of title IX as seeking to avoid the use of federal resources in 
support of discriminatory practices. IS2 If that understanding of the 
congressional purpose is combined with a definition of "education" 
that includes both the teacher and the pupil,ls3 a realistic conclusion 
is that Congress intended to protect all parties to the educational 
process from discrimination. The existence of such a reasonable 
possibility, however, does not establish such a congressional intent. 
A. Statutory Language Of Title IX 
In order to determine the scope that Congress proposed to give 
to title IX, the literal meaning of the statute ~ust be interpreted. ls4 
The first phrase is "no person."IS5 "No person" is an inclusive term 
that encompasses a wide spectrum of individuals. Inclusive lan­
guage often is followed by modifications and limitations. The signif­
icant modifications in title IX's language are the limitation of the 
on S. Joint Res. 61 and S. Joint Res. 231lJej"ore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st 
Cong., 2d Sess., (1970). 
148. See notes 44-50 supra and accompanying text. 
149. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
150. 42 U.S.c. § 2000d (1976). 
151. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1970). 
152. Id. at 704. 
153. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-80 (1979). "[AJ teacher serves as a 
role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their percep­
tions and values. Thus, through both the presentation of course materials and the exam­
ple he sets, a teacher has an opportunity to inftuence the attitudes of students toward 
government, the political process, and a citizen's social responsibilities." Id. at 78-79. 
See also Perkins, Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 
1048 (1968); Philpot, Title IX Sex Discrimination Regulations: Impact on Private Educa­
tion, 65 Ky. L.J. 656, 658 (1979). 
154. C. SANDS, supra note 43, at 70. 
155. 20 U.S.c. § 1681(a) (1976). 
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statute to those persons who, on the basis of sex, are "excluded from 
participation in, [are] denied the benefits of, or [are] subjected to dis­
crimination under any education program or activity receiving 
Federal financial assistance ...."156 
Two of these limitations arguably apply to employees. First, a 
teacher who was prevented from performing his or her function be­
cause of discrimination would be "excluded from participation in" 
the particular program or activity. The mutuality of the educational 
process and the indispensible function of the instructor l57 strongly 
indicate that his or her exclusion because of discrimination based on 
sex would be sufficient to violate title IX. 15S Second, as the Fifth 
Circuit suggested in .Dougherty County School System v. Harris,159 
"if a female . . . teacher receives less pay than a male . . . teacher 
for equal work, she is being 'subject to discrimination under' a pro­
gram receiving federal financial assistance."16o Either of these un­
derstandings of the limitations of title IX is sufficient to include 
employees within the class of persons protected under title IX. 
B. Legislative Process Of Title IX 
The legislative history of title IX also supports the inclusion of 
employees under the title IX protections. It is noteworthy that the 
possibility that employment was not covered by title IX, was never 
raised during the Senate debate or the comment period on the pre­
liminary regulations. 161 The entire issue did not arise until 1975, the 
year of the hearings on the regulations. 162 
Senator Bayh, in both his introductory comments and his sum­
mary of title IX, divided his discussion into two parts. In both in­
stances the first part dealt with title IX and the second part dealt with 
the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act. He specifically 
mentioned employment in both the first and the second portions of 
his discussion. 
156. Id. 
157. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979). 
158. Contra Romeo Comm. Schools v. HEW, 438 F. Supp. 1021, 1031 (E.D. Mich. 
1977), aJld, 600 F.2d 581 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 972 (1979). Judge Feikens said 
that teachers participate only to the extent of teaching. Id. Why is that not sufficient? 
For example, suppose a male teacher was prevented from teaching in a kindergarten 
class because the administration felt that small children needed a maternal figure. He 
would be excluded from participation in the educational activity or program. 
159. 622 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1980). 
160. Id. at 738. 
161. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 479-80. 
162. Id. at 465-68, 477-80. See also 121 CONGo REC. 59714 (1975). 
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Senator Bayh introduced his bill and said, "Amendment No. 
874 [the number of his bill] is broad, but basically it closes loopholes 
in existing legislation relating to general education programs and em­
ployment resulting from these programs."163 After additional com­
ments in which employment was mentioned further, Senator Bayh 
changed his emphasis and referred to "other important provi­
sions."I64 It was only after this new subject designator that he men­
tioned the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay ACt. 165 
Senator Bayh linked equal employment opportunities for "executive, 
administrative and professional women" to these amendments. 166 
Senator Bayh's own summary of his bill was divided into four 
parts; the first two are relevant here. 167 Part A was entitled, "Prohi­
bition Of Sex Discrimination In Federally Funded Education Pro­
grams." 168 Under this heading Senator Bayh referred to sections 
100I to 1005 169 of his amendment. 170 He explicitly noted the existing 
parallels to parts of title VI, the remedy of fund termination, and the 
exemptions he would allow under title IX. J7J He did not mention 
title VII or the Equal Pay Act under this heading. 172 The third para­
graph of Part A says in part: "This portion of the amendment covers 
discrimination in all areas where abuse has been mentioned--em­
ployment practices for faculty and administrators, scholarship aid, 
admissions, access t9 programs within the institution such as voca­
tional education classes, and so forth."173 Conversely, Part B was 
headed, "Prohibition Of Education-Related Employment Discrim­
ination"174 and, under this heading, Senator Bayh referred to title 
VII and the Equal Pay Act but made no mention of any of the provi­
sions that were to become title IX. 175 Thus, Part A of Senator Bayh's 
summary created an explicit relationship between employment and 
163. 118 CONGo REC. 5803 (1972) (emphasis added). 
164. Id. See also Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 19, supra note 17. 
165. 118 CONGo REC. 5803 (1972). 
166. Id. 
167. Parts C and D dealt with "Studies Of Sex Discrimination" and "Suits by the 
Attorney General" respectively. Id. at 5807-08. 
168. Id. at 5807. 
169. Section 1005 does not appear to fit under this heading and its inclusion ap­
pears inadvertant. Id. See 629 F.2d at 781 n.ll. 
170. 118 CONGo REC. 5807 (1972). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. 
175. Id. at 5812. 
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those sections of his bill that became title IX. Part B related employ­
ment to title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 
Senator Bayh's introduction and summary had the same divi­
sion between title IX and the amendments to title VII and the Equal 
Pay Act and, in both instances, he explicitly mentioned employment 
in relation to each portion. For such a division to occur once might 
be deemed inadvertant, but for it to occur twice raises the reasonable 
inference that Senator Bayh, the proponent of the amendment, in­
tended to include sex discrimination in educational employment 
under title IX as well as under title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 
The third relevant portion of the debate is the dialogue between 
Senators Bayh and Pell. Senator Pell began the dialogue by asking 
specifically about sections 1001(a) and (b), which became sections 
1681(a) and (c) of Title 20 of the United States Code. 176 Senator 
Pell's question related to the exclusion of admissions policies of pri­
vate undergraduate colleges from coverage and whether the exclu­
sion applied to "nonpublic institutions at the elementary and 
secondary level. ..."177 In response, Senator Bayh said, "[W]e are 
dealing with discrimination in admission to an institution, discrimi­
nation of available services or studies within an institution once stu­
dents are admitted, and discrimination in employment within an 
institution, as a member of a faculty or whatever. In the area of 
employment, we permit no exceptions." 178 
Senator Pell followed with a series of questions. 179 Each ques­
tion linked an element of title IX with an employment practice. In 
essence he asked: Does a private school have to have a faculty made 
up equally of men and women? May a parochial school use only 
nuns as teachers? Must a military school for boys have female 
faculty members?180 The Second Circuit correctly concluded that 
the questions posed by Senator Pell made no sense if both he and 
Senator Bayh did not think that employment was covered by title 
IX.181 The intent to include sex discrimination in educational em­
ployment under title IX is buttressed when the exchange between 
Senators Bayh and Pell is considered in light of the statements of 
Senator Bayh, who twice linked title IX and employment. 182 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. at 5812-13. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. 629 F.2d at 782. 
182. See text accompanying notes 163-75 supra. 
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The passage of similar bills by the House of Representatives 
and the Senate made it necessary for the matter to go to a Confer­
ence Committee where any differences would be reconciled. The 
Conference Committee made only one important change in the bills: 
It dropped section 1004 of the House bill, an explicit exclusion of 
employment from coverage. 183 The deletion of section 1004 was ex­
plained by Representative O'Hara as the correction of a drafting er­
ror. 184 He contended that the exemption in section 1004 
contradicted the amendments to title VII and the Equal Pay Act that 
were part of the bill. 18s This is the kind of ex post facto explanation 
by a member of Congress, however, that traditionally has been given 
little weight by the courts when there is no corroborative evidence in 
the legislative record. 186 The ease with which Congress could have 
limited the section exempting employment to only title IX,187 or the 
ease with which the main provision could have been applied explic­
itly to students only,188 undermines the view of Mr. O'Hara. The 
testimony of Senator Bayh at the postsecondary hearings indicated 
that title IX covered employment, and no reference was made to any 
error involving section 1004 of the House bill. 189 
Another indication that title IX was intended to include em­
ployment was Congress' failure to either disapprove of the regula­
tions or amend title IX to exclude employment. Representatives 
Quie and Erlenbom introduced an amendment to a concurrent reso­
lution to disapprove the HEW regulations relating to sex discrimina­
tion in educational employment. 190 This resolution was not reported 
out by the Education and Labor Committee.l9l Also, amendments 
introduced by Senators Helms l92 and McCIurel93 that would have 
183. CONF. REP. No. 798, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 221 (1972) reprinted in [1972] U.S. 
CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 2608, 2671-72. 
184. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 408-09. 
185. Id. 
186. Rogers V. Frito-Lay, 611 F.2d 1074, 1080 (5th Cir. 1980). See also Cannon v. 
University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 686 n.7 (1970). The weight which the Supreme 
Court the comments of senators and representatives after the passage of title IX about a 
private right of action does not apply to Representative O'Hara's comments. His com­
ments were not on the floor nor were they made in relation to any legislation which was 
adopted. Id. See also 611 F.2d at 1081. 
187. 629 F.2d at 783. 
188. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 76, § 5 (Law. Co-op 1978) (amended in 1971 to 
prohibit discrimination in education based on sex). 
189. Postsecondary Hearings, supra note 102, at 164. See also id. at 173,201. 
190. 629 F.2d at 783. 
191. See id. at 784. 
192. 121 CONGo REC. 23845-47 (1975). 
193. 122 CONGo REc. 28136-37 (1976). Senator Bayh opposed Senator McClure's 
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altered title IX radically were not adopted. 194 If title IX was not 
intended to cover employment, Congress had sufficient opportunity 
to amend it or alter the regulations; but did not do so. 
C. Remedy Provisions Of Title IX And Employment 
The North Haven and Trumbull school boards argued that if 
title IX were construed as covering employment, two inconsistencies 
would be created between the main portion of the statute and the 
remedy provision. 19s The first conflict allegedly would exist between 
the program specific fund termination remedy a~d the "inherent," 
nonprogram specific nature of employment. 196 Title IX mandates 
that if funds are terminated because of discrimination, the funds 
must be terminated only to the specific program in which the dis­
crimination has occurred. 197 The school boards contended that em­
ployment does not relate to specific programs and therefore the fund 
termination remedy could not be applied as the statute requires. 198 
The argument that program specific fund termination is incon­
sistent with the inherently nonprogram nature of employment may 
be applied equally to other areas that undisputedly are covered by 
title IX. The Second Circuit has noted that the difficulty of applica­
tion could be raised against the fund termination remedy in gen­
era1. 199 "For instance, discrimination in admissions to an 
institution's graduate schools is clearly prohibited by Title IX re­
gardless of whether the discrimination occurs solely in one graduate 
program or all graduate programs. "200 The argument, therefore, of­
fers no logical reason why Congress would not have intended title IX 
to reach sex discrimination in educational employment.201 
The school boards also advanced a second argument recognized 
by the Second Circuit as speaking "both to the heart and to 'common 
amendment and commented on its enormous impact on title IX specifically pointing to 
employment. Id. at 28144. . 
194. 121 CONGo REC. 23847 (1975) (amendment of Senator Helms); 122 CONGo 
REC. 28147 (1976) (amendment of Senator McClure). 
195. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34-37, supra note 14. 
196. Id.; 438 F. Supp. at 1033. 
197. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). 
198. Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34-37, supra note 14. 
199. 629 F.2d at 785. 
200. Id. 
201. A factual question might arise as to whether the difficulty in terminating the 
funds of a particular program was created by the educational system itself. If the internal 
distribution of the federal funds in question was determined by the school board, it 
hardly would be equitable to allow the board to perpetuate discrimination by asserting 
that non tainted programs would be injured. 
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sense.' "202 The argument suggested that Congress could not have 
intended to deprive students of the benefit of federal money based 
upon discrimination against teachers.203 The argument, however, 
encounters two difficulties. First, as the Second Circuit noted, the 
same unfairness would occur if funds were terminated because one 
student was discriminated against.204 The termination of funds 
would cause the remaining students to suffer.205 The sweep of the 
argument is too expansive. 
Second, the argument rests on a mistaken premise. The school 
boards contended that "[t]he principal (indeed the only) enforcement 
method specifically mentioned is fund termination."206 Although 
that is true, the argument requires that the remedy of fund termina­
tion be either the only remedy or be an arbitrarily utilized remedy. 
Title IX, however, does provide for other remedies when it says en­
forcement may be effected "by any other means authorized by 
law... ."207 In Cannon v. University of Chicago,208 the United 
States Supreme Court recognized fund termination to be a drastic 
remedy and declared it inappropriate if only "an isolated violation 
has occurred."209 The Court specifically noted the priority of reme­
dies in title IX: "Congress itself has noted the severity of the fund­
cutoff remedy and has described it as a last resort all else-including 
'lawsuits'-failing."210 Thus in the case of a single teacher who was 
discriminated against, HEW could seek a court order for reinstate­
ment, back pay, an injunction, or other appropriate remedy. The 
ultimate threat of fund termination would be held in reserve to be 
used against recalcitrant offenders. 
Safeguards also exist against arbitrary utilization of title IX. 
Any remedy imposed on an educational institution under HEW reg­
ulations must proceed through the established administrative pro­
202. 629 F.2d at 785. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id. 
206. Brief for PlaintiffS-Appellees at 34, supra note 14. Judge Feikens clearly mis­
construed the thrust of section 1682 when he said, "(TJhe only sanction permitted under 
section 1682 is a termination of federal funds to the noncomplying institution." 438 F. 
Supp. at 1032 (emphasis added). See also Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 23, supra 
note 17. 
207. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976). 
208. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
209. Id. at 705. 
210. Id. at 705 n.38. See also United States v. Frazer, 297 F. Supp. 319, 322 (M.D. 
Ala. 1968). 
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cess211 and is subject to judicial review.212 In the final instance, 
Congress can intervene by amending the statute if it determines that 
the agency has overreached its authority.213 
D. Regulatory Scope Of Title IX 
The analysis of the language, the internal structure, the legisla­
tive history, and the post-enactment events relating to title IX point 
conclusively to Congress' intent to cover sex discrimination in educa­
tional employment under title IX. A further issue, however, re­
mains: What is the scope to be given to title IX in the area of 
employment? In this context, "scope" has two components. First, 
title IX only applies to "programs or activities" that receive federal 
funds. 214 How narrowly are the terms "programs" .:>r "activities" to 
be interpreted? HEW has interpreted "program" so broadly that it 
can encompass the entire educational institution.2ls Thus, if one 
dollar of federal money goes to an institution, all facets of the insti­
tution are subject to title IX. The institutions, conversely, have in­
sisted that "program" refers to a limited element of the institution's 
life, that the particular element must be a recipient of federal assist­
ance, and that the element must be proven to have been adminis­
tered in a discriminatory manner.216 
In North Haven, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sec­
ond Circuit dealt with the program specific issue by concluding that 
the program specific requirement applied to the implementation of 
the fund termination remedy and not to HEW's authority to issue 
regulations.217 The court, in dicta, said that broad regulations cover­
ing all aspects of employment can be promulgated; but, if HEW 
seeks fund termination, a specific program that receives federal 
funds must be designated as discriminatory.2ls Federal assistance to 
an entire system can be terminated only if the discrimination perme­
ates the entire system.219 This analysis rested on United States v. Jef
ferson County Board ofEducation,220 in which a broad interpretation 
211. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1976). 
212. 20 U.S.c. § 1683 (1976). But see 600 F.2d at 584. 
213. For example. consider the exceptions that Congress has added since the pas­
sage of title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6)-(9). 
214. Id. § 1681 (1976). 
215. See Brief for Fed. Appellants at 41-45, supra note 26. 
216. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellees at 34-37, supra note 14. 
217. 629 F.2d at 785-86. 
218. Id. 
219. Id. 
220. 372 F.2d 836, 847-61 (1966). 
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was given to identical language in title VI.221 The same point was 
made regarding the "pinpoint" provision of title VI in Flanagan v. 
President and Directors ofGeorgetown College,222 in which the use of 
federal funds in the construction of the Law Center was held suffi­
cient to bring all the institution's programs under title VI.223 The 
court said, "This provision (Title 42 of the United States Code, Sec­
tion 2000d-l) of course is directed towards the efforts of federal 
agencies in eff"ecting compliance with Title VI and is not a restriction 
on the types of discrimination outlawed by the statute."224 The stat­
utory structure of title IX lends support to this conclusion. The pro­
gram specific language appears in the section dealing with remedies 
and not the section authorizing HEW to promulgate the 
regulations.225 
The second aspect of the scope problem raises the question 
whether all employment practices can be regulated under title IX. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Dough­
erry, hinted that some aspects of employment might be covered, but 
the court offered no real clues as to how any division should be 
made.226 The sole example the court used, the disparity in pay be­
tween a male teacher and a female teacher performing equivalent 
work and paid with federal funds, is not particularly helpful.227 The 
best solution is to step back and consider the policies underlying title 
IX. The general policy is to prevent the use of federal resources to 
support discriminatory practices.228 A more specific policy is to pre­
vent the use of federal resources to support discriminatory practices 
in education. If education is the focus, then the employment prac­
tices that Congress intended to reach through title IX ought to be 
those practices that impinge on the educational process. For exam­
ple, consider the facts as presented in the cases joined in North Ha­
ven. The North Haven branch involved the maternity leave policies 
of the school system.229 Whether the maternity leave policies of the 
school system were discriminatory was a serious issue, but it did not 
impinge on or have a nexus with the educational process in a way 
that reduced the quality of that process. On the other hand, the issue 
221. See 42 U.S.c. § 2000d-l (1976). 
222. 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976). 
223. Id. at 385. 
224. Id. at 383 (emphasis added). 
225. 20 U.S.c. § 1682 (1976). 
226. 622 F.2d at 738. 
227. Id. 
228. 441 U.S. at 704. 
229. 629 F.2d at 775. 
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in the Trumbull branch allegedly involved procedures that 
demeaned and eventually resulted in the termination of the only fe­
male counselor at the junior high school level in the school sys­
tem.230 The lack of any female counselors to respond to questions 
from the female students in an adolescent school population effec­
tively denied those students many benefits of that program. The al­
leged sexual discrimination against Ms. Potz impinged upon the 
access to the counseling program of all students at the junior high 
school level in the Trumbull school system. The residual effect of 
such a deprivation on the educational process as a whole would be a 
question of fact, but could be hypothesized as effecting classroom 
behavior, socialization, course selection, and career choices. If such 
impairments could be proven, title IX ought to protect the educa­
tional process and provide relief to Ms. Potz. Such relief might be 
any appropriate remedy, including fund termination, if the school 
board was recalcitrant. 231 
The proposed pattern of analysis would permit HEW to investi­
gate complaints on the basis of broadly drawn regulations. The spe­
cific facts of each case would be measured against strictly construed 
elements when trying to prove a particular title IX violation.232 
There are four elements that HEW or the private plaintiff would 
have to prove. First, a sexually discriminatory employment practice 
would have to be shown to exist. Second, the discriminatory practice 
would have to be linked to the educational process.233 Third, a pro­
gram or activity receiving federal assistance would have to be shown 
to be discriminatory.234 Finally, the appropriate remedy would have 
to be selected. The appropriate remedy, of course, must be the least 
intrusive means toward eliminating the discrimination.235 
Such an application of title IX would fulfill the policy of 
preventing the use of federal funds to support discriminatory actions. 
Simultaneously, the educational institutions would be assured of a 
fair remedy for isolated violations, while HEW would retain the 
fund termination remedy for recalcitrant defendants. 
230. /d.; Brief for Appellant Linda Potz at 25-32, supra note 17. 
231. See text accompanying notes 206-13 supra. 
232. A similar pattern has developed in suits brought under the Securities Act of 
1934, IS U.S.c. § 78j (1976). See generally Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980); Chiarella 
v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723 (1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cerro denied,404 
U.S. 1005 (1971). 
233. See notes 226-32 supra and accompanying text. 
234. See notes 214-25 supra and accompanying text. 
235. See notes 209-13 supra and accompanying text. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
In North Haven Board ofEducation v. Hufttedler,236 the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit validated regulations 
issued by HEW that included sex discrimination in educational em­
ployment under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.237 
North Haven is contrary to the decisions of fourteen other federal 
courts that have invalidated the same regulations. North Haven is 
ripe for consideration by the United States Supreme Court. 
The Second Circuit, in its attempt to construe congressional in­
tent, found the language of title IX ambiguous regarding the statute's 
coverage of sex-based, employment discrimination.238 The main 
support for interpreting title IX as covering employment discrimina­
tion was found in the legislative history and the subsequent failure 
by Congress to exclude employment from coverage.239 The court 
specifically noted the deletion of an explicit exclusion of employ­
ment from the House version of title IX by the Conference Commit­
tee.240 In dicta, the court discussed the remedies available under title 
IX and decided that the main remedy, termination of federal assist­
ance to the discriminating institution, was drastic but not so extreme 
that Congress could not have intended it to be applied in employ­
ment cases.241 
The conclusion that employment can be regulated under title IX 
does not end the inquiry. The issue of the scope of title IX within the 
area of employment remains. The scope issue has two components. 
First, as title IX only applies to programs or activities receiving fed­
eral funds, how broadly are the words program and activity to be 
interpreted? The Second Circuit correctly interpreted the intention 
of Congress to restrict the application of the remedies to specific 
programs or activities that receive federal assistance and not to re­
strict the ability of HEW to regulate potential instances of sex dis­
crimination in education.242 The second question regarding the 
scope of title IX is whether all employment practices are covered. In 
light of the title IX policy to prevent the use of federal resources to 
support discriminatory practices in education, it is logical that the 
236. 629 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. granted sub nom. North Haven Bd. of Educ. 
v. Bell, 450 U.S. 909 (1981) (cases joined for decision). 
237. Id. at 786. 
238. See notes 27-32 supra and accompanying text. 
239. See notes 44-88 & 128-31 supra and accompanying text. 
240. See notes 89-106 supra and· accompanying text. 
241. See notes 132-41 supra and accompanying text. 
242. 629 F.2d at 785. 
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employment practices covered be those that have a nexus with the 
educational process. 
If liability under title IX is established, there remains the selec­
tion of an appropriate remedy. Title IX allows HEW or the court to 
tailor the remedy to fit the severity of the discrimination. All the 
usual legal remedies are available but, in the case of a recalcitrant 
school board, the federal funds may be terminated. 
Title IX authorizes HEW to regulate sex discrimination in edu­
cational employment. The broad regulations promulgated by HEW 
are within the scope of title IX. In any particular case, however, the 
plainti.ff has to establish that a sexually discriminatory employment 
practice exists, that the practice is linked to the educational process, 
that the program or activity affected receives federal assistance, and 
that an appropriate remedy exists before he or she can prevail under 
title IX.243 
Car! T. Holt 
243. See notes 235-36 supra and accompanying text. 
